Renz's Thesis No. 4 - The Deuteronomic permission implies that usury is not intrinsically immoral

Discussion of this Thesis is complicated by the manner of its expression. Thomas has cast the question as whether or not usury is “intrinsically immoral.” This is a question that might appeal to those of a Greek philosophical mindset, but really is not a matter of much concern for those devoted to Christian theology. Whereas Aquinas was influenced by Greek philosophy, he brought a Greek-like speculation into pursuit of Christian theology. Accordingly, I reserve discussion of the “intrinsic” nature of usury to my forthcoming (d.v.) reply to Thesis 8, where this matter more directly is under consideration. For present purposes, I wish only to argue that the Christian is interested in the requirements and prohibitions of God’s Law, and not in abstract and speculative issues such as whether a thing or an action is “intrinsically” wrong. It may or may not be valid to do so, but I wish to translate the current Thesis to hold that the Deuteronomic permission implies that usury cannot be regarded as generally unlawful.

Thomas surveys a number of proposed interpretations of the Deuteronomic permission that allow the conviction of the general unlawfulness of usury to stand. One idea (e.g. Aquinas) was that the permission was a concession to an evil disposition, but Thomas discards this on the strength that it is incompatible with the charge to Israel to treat the stranger charitably. Another idea (e.g. Calvin) was that Israel was permitted usury on loans to foreigners in reciprocation, as this put them on an equal footing since loans of foreigners to Israelites would bear usury. Thomas dismisses this notion for similar reasons.

A third proposal gets a little more of Thomas’s attention. This view (e.g. Ambrose) suggests that usury was permitted on loans to foreigners because they were enemies. Thomas rightly identifies myself as a modern proponent of this view. He objects to this view on three grounds. First, he complains that there is no hint of warfare in the text. But, this is simply the fallacy of begging the question. Whether or not there is a hint of warfare in the text depends upon whether or not nokri indicates enemy. Thomas utilizes the conclusion he wishes to reach (nokri does not indicate enemy) as its own basis on which to reach it. Second, he objects that the meaning of nokri cannot be restricted to Canaanite under the ban. I agree that the denotation of the term nokri certainly cannot be so restricted. However, the connotation and usage of the term in this text certainly might imply the Canaanites et al that Israel imminently were to encounter. That is, arguing that nokri cannot be restricted to a narrow meaning hardly proves that it cannot generally signify enemy. Third, Thomas states, “there is a difference between subjugating by usury and putting under the ban.” And so there is. The charge to destroy the Canaanite peoples utterly, and the charge to make no covenant with them, surely might have been understood as prohibiting loans to them on any terms. Thus, the specific permission of Deuteronomy 23:20 was useful in this regard. It already had been explained to Israel that God would drive out the nations before them “little by little,” so the land would not become desolate and overrun by wild animals before Israel could grow to occupy it (Dt. 7:22) The subjugation of usury in this interim was a fitting means of conquest in this sort of extended campaign.

Thomas argues for the explanation that nokri were simply foreigners who were outside of Israel’s polity (as opposed to ger, who were foreigners within Israel’s polity as sojourners). Says he, “It is thus eminently plausible that Deuteronomy’s distinction between a ger and a nokri is between resident (semi-assimilated ) and non-resident (non-assimilated).” He further argues that nokri “had not fallen on hard times,” but ”were seeking to expand economically.” In this view of things, the conclusion easily is reached that usury cannot be seen as generally oppressive, for, “… they [Israel] must not oppress a stranger, and yet might exact usury from him.” (Matthew Henry, c. 1720) However, such a view is completely speculative regarding the economic status of nokri, and does no justice at all to the distinction in Hebrew between nokri and ger.

J. A. Selbie, contributor to the Hastings Bible Dictionary, noted that the King James tended to translate ger and nokri both as “stranger,” and rued this convention “…because it obscures to the English reader the distinction between the foreigner and the ger, which in Hebrew is marked clearly enough, and on which not a little depends for the understanding of many passages.” (Vol. II, p. 49) In Hebrew ger has the meaning of sojourner. One who is ger is a “stranger” in the sense of originating from another people - a people other than the people among whom he dwells. Ger is simply “other.” In contrast to this, nokri means “strange” in a distinctly negative way. Nokri is a valuation. Nokri are not simply “other,” but are “odd.” Discussion of this sense is elaborated in Harris, Archer, Waltke, eds., Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament. The oddness of nokri was not merely an item of curiosity. Their oddness consisted in their heathen gods and heathen ways. They were to be opposed. As Selbie put it, “foreigner and enemy were almost convertible terms.” There is an extended discussion that might be undertaking surveying the usage of nokri and ger in various texts. Such a survey bears out the points made above. Further debate of these points, and deliberation of various examples of usage, shall be reserved to the comment section.

The prohibition of oppressing ger, combined with the permission to exact usury of nokri, hardly proves that usury cannot be essentially oppressive. The status of usury taken of nokri is a completely separate question from that of usury taken of ger. The command not to oppress ger means that ger - people from other lands who are sojourners with Israel - are protected by the laws of Israel. The law prohibits usury, and so ger enjoy the protection of this prohibition. The permission to exact usury of nokri is speaking of a completely different sphere. The difference has nothing at all to do with nokri being people of means, or pursuing a profit. There is nothing in any text that would suggest such a thing. The difference involves the negative connotations of the term nokri. Permission to exact usury of nokri mitigates the immorality of usury no more than Numbers 35:30 mitigates the immorality of murder when it requires that the murderer (ratsach) shall be put to death (ratsach). Thus, Thomas’s Fourth Thesis is not affirmed.